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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal rises from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Leslie

A.

Lewis

presiding.

The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §782a-3(2)(K).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides at
subparagraph

(b) that the brief of the Appellee not include a

statement of issues, unless "the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant". Appellee is not dissatisfied with the
issues as stated.

However, Appellee is dissatisfied the statement

of the Appellant regarding the standard of review.

As will be

discussed below, the standard of review which should be applied in
this case is a "clear abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous"
standard.

The authorities for this position are set out in the

argument portion of this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
In this case the Plaintiff, Brent A. Ferrin, was employed by

the Defendant, Keith B. Romney between 1986 and 1990.
owned and operated a
City.

Mr. Romney

condominium consulting firm in Salt Lake

The agreement between these parties was that Mr. Ferrin

would receive 25% of all income earned by Mr. Romney during the
time of employment of Mr. Ferrin.

The agreement between the

parties was that Mr. Ferrin would be entitled to receive this 25%
when it was received by Mr. Romney.
The parties recognized that often the income, in the form of
consulting fees, was earned by Mr. Ferrin and Mr. Romney but was
not paid until some time later.

Mr. Ferrin brought an action to

recover his 25% share of income which had been earned by Mr. Ferrin
and Mr. Romney, prior to the termination of employment, but which
income was actually received after Mr. Ferrin left Mr. Romney's
employ.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
This case was tried to a jury, commencing on January 25, 1993,

and continuing through January 28, 1993. The matter was submitted
to the jury in the form of a Special Verdict, which was returned
in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
Jury Verdict
Defendant,

was granted

granting

to

in favor of Plaintiff

Plaintiff

a

judgment

A Judgment on
and against

of $102,681.42,

together with a 20% share of all other monies received by the
Defendant after that date on certain projects upon which income had
been earned but not received.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The verdict of the jury was entered after the presentation of
three full days of evidence.

The verdict of the jury is well
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within, and supported by, the evidence presented.

The verdict of

the jury should be allowed to stand.
The rulings of the trial court on both the admissibility of
the evidence and on the taxing of costs are matters within the
discretion of the trial court. They are to be overturned on appeal
only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion and only when
the decisions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.
Regarding the issue of the admissibility

of Defendant's

proposed Exhibits 57 and 58, the trial court was well within its
discretion to rule that both Exhibits were irrelevant.

This was

a case involving the compensation arrangement between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant and nothing more.

The Defendant and the

Plaintiff, on an ongoing basis, had been discussing the possibility
of the Plaintifffs purchase of the Defendant's business.

Both

Exhibits 57 and 58 relate exclusively to the attempts of the
Plaintiff

and

Defendant

to

negotiate

a buy-out arrangement.

Neither one of these documents relates to the negotiations between
the parties as to the compensation arrangement of the Plaintiff as
an employee of the Defendant.
was

a

matter

which

had

The compensation of the Plaintiff

already

been

negotiated

and

set.

Accordingly, the trial court was clearly within its authority to
rule

that

negotiations,

and

documents

reflecting

those

negotiations, regarding the attempts of the parties to buy or sell
the business were irrelevant.
On the issue of the taxing of costs, the Appellate Courts of
Utah have consistently ruled that the taxing of costs is a matter
3

within the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, only
actual

travel

costs

of

out-of-state

witnesses

Plaintiff was clearly the prevailing party.

were

taxed.

Plaintiff should,

therefore, be entitled to recover those costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT
IN EXCLUDING EXHIBITS 57 AND 58.
A.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
As noted at the outset of this Brief, an issue is raised by

the Defendant as to the applicable standard of review which this
Court should apply in reviewing the exclusion of certain evidence.
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the law in Utah is not
subject to debate on this issue.

Rulings as to the admissibility

or exclusion of evidence are uniquely left to the sound discretion
of the trial court and are not to be overturned, unless there is
a clear abuse of that discretion showing the ruling of the trial
court to be clearly erroneous.
Although the issue of the standard of review has been the
subject of much scrutiny by the Appellate Courts, the position of
the Courts has not changed.

In the case of Bambrouah v. Bethers,

552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule
which is presently applicable:
The judgment of the trial court will not be reversed
unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein
has been abused. The trial court is given considerable
discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted
is relevant. Even if the evidence was erroneously
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admitted, that fact alone is insufficient to set aside
a verdict, unless it has "had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict". Id. at 1290.
The ruling in Bambrough was supported by the subsequent
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Terry v. Zions £o-0p.
Mercantile Institution. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

There, the

Court, in affirming the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence
on relevancy grounds, held:
It is generally conceded the trial court is more
competent, in the exercise of this discretion, to judge
the exigencies of a particular case, and, therefore, when
exercised within normal limits, the discretion should not
be disturbed. The general rule followed by this court
is the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed
unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein
has been abused. Id. at 322-23.
The later decision in McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P. 2d 298 (Utah
1984) , reversed Terry on the issue of false imprisonment but did
not reverse Terry on the issue of the admissibility of evidence.
The more recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have
applied, with consistency, the abuse of discretion standard. Thus,
in Nav v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993), the
Court, in affirming the trial court's exclusion of irrelevant
evidence, stated:
We begin our discussion of the recall and redesign
evidence by stating the appropriate standard of review.
We review a trial court's determination that evidence
should be excluded . . . for abuse of discretion and
reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of
reasonability. Xd. at 1262.
Likewise, in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court, in its Footnote No. 11 at page 1270, held that a
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"correctness" standard is not to be applied as to the trial court
rulings on admissibility of evidence and other factual findings.
Accordingly, the standard of review here to be applied is one
which grants to the trial court broad discretion as to its rulings
on relevancy, which rulings are not to be overturned unless there
is a showing of clear abuse.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXCLUDING EXHIBITS 57 AND 58.
With

respect

to the ruling

of the trial

court on the

admissibility of Exhibits 57 and 58, Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected . . . .
While Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence gives a broad
definition of the term "relevance", the issue of what is relevant
at trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The
reason for this principle is that there is no exact definition of
the term relevance. Accordingly, discretion must be granted to the
trial court to make determinations as the evidence is presented.
In the case at hand, the trial court allowed the Defendant to
make a complete proffer as to Exhibits 57 and 58.
proffer made is not in dispute.

(R. 1182.) The

The Defendant admitted that the

two documents which he desired to admit were documents relating,
not to the issue of the compensation arrangement between Plaintiff
and Defendant, but, rather, to the attempts by the Plaintiff and
Defendant to negotiate a sale of Defendant's
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business.

(R. 1183.)

In other words, the documents did not deal

with any issue before the trial court.
an

issue which

was

completely

The documents dealt with

separate

and

apart

from

the

compensation issue at trial.
At no time did the Defendant allege or proffer that during the
negotiations

for the sale of the business the issue of the

compensation of the Plaintiff arose. The Defendant did not allege,
nor proffer, that the issue of what the Defendant should pay the
Plaintiff for his efforts was an issue in the negotiations as to
what the Defendant might be willing to sell his business for.
A decision as to the exclusion or admission of evidence is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court because it is a
matter of logic and experience, not a matter of law.
State v. Abu-Isba. 235 Kan. 851, 685 P.2d 856 (1984).

See, e.g. ,
In State v.

Wagner, 248 Kan. 240, 807 P.2d 139 (1991), the Kansas Supreme
Court, dealing with the definition of relevance which is identical
to Rule 401, stated:
For evidence of collateral facts to be competent, there
must be some natural or logical connection between them
and the inference or result they are designed to
establish. Id. at 142.
Likewise, in People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal.3d 660, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69,
767 P.2d 253 (1988), the Supreme Court of California, again dealing
with the statutory definition of relevance identical to our own,
declared:
The trial court is vested with wide discretion in
determining the relevance of evidence.
[Citation
omitted.] The court, however, has no discretion to admit
irrelevant evidence. [Citation omitted.] Speculative
inferences that are derived from evidence cannot be
7

deemed to be relevant to establish the speculatively
inferred fact . . .. Id. at 263. (Emphasis added.)
The Trial Judge, Judge Lewis, accurately

and adequately

applied each of these principles in her ruling.

The trial court

correctly

Court

noted

that

the

issue

before

the

was

the

compensation agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and what
monies Plaintiff was entitled to receive as a result of his
agreement with the Defendant.

(R. 1187A.)

The trial court

correctly noted that Exhibits 57 and 58 had nothing whatsoever to
do

with

the

Defendant.

compensation
(R.

1188.)

arrangement
Those

between

documents

Plaintiff

dealt

solely

and
and

exclusively with the issue of Plaintiff purchasing Defendant's
business.

As Judge Lewis stated:

We are not talking about this agreement. We are not
talking about an anticipated agreement that may or may
not have been entered by the parties. We are talking
about a specific compensation agreement that is not
covered in this document. (R. 1188.)
Exhibits 57 and 58 were simply not helpful in proving any
disputed fact.
irrelevant.

They were, in the classic sense of the word,

The following facts, among others, support this

conclusion:
1.

Both documents dealt with negotiations for the

purchase of the business, not with the issue of compensation
between Plaintiff and Defendant.
2.

Each of the documents were nothing more than a

proposal, created as a part of a preliminary negotiation.
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No

agreement was ever entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant
which even remotely resembled either Exhibit 57 or Exhibit 58.
3.
Defendant

The

thinks

pertinent
is

language

important,

deals

from
with

Exhibit
the

57 which

hypothetical

situation of the Defendant remaining with the company after he had
sold it to Plaintiff.

The language cited by the Defendant stands

for the proposition that, if the Defendant remained with the
Plaintiff after purchase of the business, the Defendant would be
entitled to compensation. Defendant apparently argues that, since
such proposal was made, it obviously shows that the agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendant on Plaintiff's compensation was the
same.

(R. 1183.)

Such a presumption is illogical and not

supported by any other evidence.
4.

Exhibit 58, was not even drafted by Plaintiff and

does not constitute his words. It was made clear by counsel during
the argument on this issue, that Exhibit 58 was a proposed draft
prepared by an attorney for Plaintiff and that the language which
the attorney placed in the document was not Plaintiff's language
and was not approved by Plaintiff.

Indeed, it was proffered that

the Plaintiff would testify that the document was unacceptable,
even to Plaintiff and was never used as a part of the negotiations.
(R. 1187.)
Accordingly, there is only the most tenuous of connections
between Exhibits 57 and 58 and the issue before the trial court.
The documents were nothing more than discussion drafts. There was
not evidence ever adduced to show that either document represented
9

the mind, will or desires of either party.

It is illogical to

presume that when two parties negotiate on subject A, without
regard to subject B, there negotiations are somehow probative of
the issues on subject B.
The

parties

agreement.

were

attempting

to

hammer

out

a

buy/sell

That buy/sell agreement did not include, in any way,

the issue of the then-current compensation of the Plaintiff.

The

connection, therefore, between these documents and the issue of
Plaintiff's compensation is non-existent.
C.

EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 403.
Although not specifically mentioned by Judge Lewis, it is

apparent that the ruling of the trial court excluding Exhibits 57
and 58, is also supported by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Rule 403 provides as follows:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
The Plaintiff believes that the trial court was clearly
correct in ruling that the negotiations regarding the buy-out
agreement were totally

irrelevant to the issues being tried.

However, it is also apparent that the exclusion of the evidence by
the Trial Judge can be supported by the above-quoted Rule.
The trial court was faced with the task of focusing the jury
on the issue of the amount of compensation to which the Plaintiff
was entitled under his arrangement with the Defendant.
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The buy-

out negotiations between the parties were a separate event which
was totally unconnected to the issue of Plaintiff's compensation.
Therefore, allowing Exhibits 57 and 58 would unduly mislead and
tend to confuse the jury.

It would allow the jury to focus on an

issue which was not presented and which was not necessary for a
determination as to the compensation of the Plaintiff.
In addition, the admission of Exhibits 57 and 58 would have
unduly delayed and complicated the trial.

The trial court was

aware that Exhibit 58, by the testimony of the Plaintiff, was a
draft document put together by an attorney.

The Plaintiff would

have testified that the document was unacceptable to him and would
not reflect the facts as he understood them.

(R. 1187.) Admission

of Exhibit 58 would have required the parties to call the attorney
as a witness, thereby unduly delaying the trial and wasting the
time of the Court and parties.
acceptable reason

Under Rule 403, such is an

for denying the admissibility

of evidence,

especially in light of its highly questionable probative value.
D.

ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 WOULD NOT HAVE ALTERED THE
OUTCOME.
The Defendant is correct that to be reversible error, the

exclusion of evidence must be shown to have a reasonable likelihood
of affecting the outcome. See, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah
1989) . The Plaintiff believes that the ruling of the trial court
on relevancy is sufficient and correct.

However, assuming, for

purposes of argument, that the trial court was in error, the error
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must be shown to have been prejudicial.

The Defendant has failed

to make such a showing.
Even if Exhibits 57 and 58 had been admitted, they were of
little probative value.

Exhibit 57 talks about the compensation

that Keith Romney would get if he stayed with Brent Ferrin after
the purchase of the business.

What Keith Romney would have

received has nothing to do with what Brent Ferrin was receiving.
Exhibit 58, as has been argued above, was nothing more than
a preliminary draft which was not even approved for circulation or
use by the Plaintiff.

It did not represent his present view of

anything and was an unacceptable document.

It was part of a

preliminary negotiation for buy-out which never came to fruition.
At the same time, there was ample evidence that the Defendant
had benefitted greatly from the efforts of the Plaintiff and that
the income of the Defendant had substantially increased as a result
of the Plaintiff's help.

There was also an admission by the

Defendant that Plaintiff would receive his share of the income
which had been earned but not received.
The admission is contained in Exhibit 10-P. In Exhibit 10-P,
the Defendant states:
Brent A. Ferrin has been my executive vice-president
since July, 1986, and as such receives 2 5% of the net
income that Keith Romney Associates (KRA) earns.
(Emphasis added.)
Later in the document, the Defendant admits that the Plaintiff will
be entitled to his 25% share at some future date when money was
received, stating as follows:
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Therefore, Brent will be entitled to 25% ($75,000.00) at
that time, with the balance becoming due at transfer of
title.
E.

CONCLUSION AS TO ADMISSIBILITY.
There is simply not space in this Brief to recount for this

Court all of the evidence which was adduced in support of the
position taken by the Plaintiff.

This is the reason why the

Appellate Courts of this State have consistently allowed broad
discretion to the trial court in making determinations of relevancy
and of admissibility under Rules 401, 402 and 403. The trial court
was in a unique position to assess whether or not the documents,
even if technically relevant, would add anything to this matter or
would result in confusion, delay and wasted time. The trial court
was in a unique position to be able to determine whether or not the
documents would have any effect on the outcome, given the other
overwhelming evidence presented at trial. Clearly, the trial court
was correct and the exclusion of Exhibits 57 and 58 was not error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTS TAXING
OF COSTS WAS APPROPRIATE.
During the course of the trial, Plaintiff called two non-party
witnesses, Mr. Jim Vernes and Mr. Bruce McEntire.
reside outside of the State of Utah.

Both witnesses

Their appearance was

voluntary, at the request of the Plaintiff.

Their testimony was

clearly necessary in order to prove all of the elements of the
case, including compensation and the amount thereof.
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The Plaintiff admits that in its Memorandum

of Costs the

actual travel expenses of both witnesses are included for a total
of $1,142.95. The Court allowed costs of $1,773.85. The Plaintiff
therefore

assumes that the Defendant

has no quarrel with the

remainder of the costs incurred, but objects only to the travel
expenses of these two witnesses.

Plaintiff also assumes that the

Defendant would have no objection to the taxing of costs at twentyfive cents per mile, one way, within the State of Utah, for each
witness.
The award of costs is governed by Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The issue of which costs are to be

allowed is defined by the case law.
This Court's recent decision in Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684
(Utah App. 1990) , is helpful.

In Morgan, this Court noted that the

award of costs is reviewed under a "abuse of discretion" standard.
This Court also noted, in Morgan. that the rule on costs is not as
strict as the Defendant would argue.

The standard to be applied,

in accordance with the ruling in Morgan, is as follows:
Costs are generally allowable only in the amounts and in
the manner provided by statute, but the [Utah] Supreme
Court has taken the position that the trial court can
exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance
of costs; and that it has a duty to guard against any
excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof. Id. at 686.
The trial court has not abused its discretion in this regard.
The

testimony

necessary

of

Mr.

Vernes

to the proving

and

Mr.

McEntire

of Plaintiff's

case.

were

entirely

Without

their

testimony, Plaintiff would have had less of a chance of prevailing.
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The Defendant argues that the travel costs of the witnesses
are eliminated by §21-5-4, Utah Code Annotated.

However, to tax

costs on the basis of twenty-five cents per mile for each mile
traveled inside of the State is arbitrary, if not impossible. Each
of these Defendants traveled from outside of the State of Utah.
The exact route taken by Mr. McEntire is unknown. The route taken
by Mr. Vernes was an airline route.
also unknown.

The exact number of miles is

It is, therefore, impossible to compute the miles

at twenty-five cents, one way only.

To do so results in an

improper and artificial calculation.
Accordingly,

this

Court

should

allow

the

trial

court's

discretion in this matter and allow the actual expenses of travel
incurred by these witnesses.

This Court's ruling in Morgan give

just such discretion.
CONCLUSION
This matter was tried to a jury for approximately three days.
The Defendant was given every opportunity to produce relevant
evidence.

On the issue of Exhibits 57 and 58, the trial court

ruled that the documents themselves were irrelevant. However, the
trial court did allow the Defendant to ask the witness, for
impeachment purposes, whether his understanding of compensation was
consistent with the language found in the Exhibits.

(R. 1188.)

The Defendant did not choose to follow the Court's ruling in that
regard.

Accordingly, the Defendant should not be allowed to

complain, now, that he was prejudiced in some manner.
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The judgment of the trial court is founded upon competent
evidence and should be allowed to stand.
DATED this

/^^-

day of October, r993

IE R. SMITH
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellee was hand-delivered to the following individual
at the address shown below this

/$

DAVID L. BLACKNER
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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